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The Wages of Ambivalence: On the Context
and Prospects of New York's Death
Penalty
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRINGt
INTRODUCTION
This note aims to be a modest contribution to a vast and ne-
glected topic: the political science of capital punishment. Five
years ago, I published statistical evidence illustrating that the
states that actually conducted executions during the 1980s were a
self-selected subset of those jurisdictions that sentenced prisoners
to death.1 Ten of the states that had been in the top twelve in
rates of execution in the 1950s (when execution rates were under
state rather than federal control) were also among the thirteen
states that conducted executions in the 1980s.2 The inference I
drew was that if the local culture was strongly supportive of execu-
tions in a state, the barriers to execution that existed in the 1980s
were overcome.3
If states that really wanted executions in the 1980s conducted
executions, what then explained the fact that sixty-five percent of
all the jurisdictions in the United States that maintained a death
penalty conducted no executions during the 1980s?4 The implica-
tion I drew from the statistical pattern was that these states, too,
were a self-selected subset of death penalty jurisdictions with
larger levels of ambivalence about putting human beings to death.5
Judges and public officials were less apt to wholeheartedly support
executions, the political climate was less apt to demand executions,
and opposition to the practice was more likely among lawyers and
t William G. Simon Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of
Law; Director, Earl Warren Legal Institute. Michael Laurence was, as usual, enormously
helpful in the research that produced this article. Sam Kamin and William Nelson provided
able research assistance.
1. Franklin E. Zimring, Ambivalence in State Capital Punishment Policy: An Empiri-
cal Sounding, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 729 (1991).
2. Id. at 740 (table 4).
3. Id. at 740-41.
4. Of the thirty-eight states with death penalty statutes in May 1980, only thirteen
conducted executions during the 1980s. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FuND,
DEATH Row, U.S.A. REPORTER 67, 71-73 (1990) (hereinafter, DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1990)).
5. Zimring, supra note 1, at 740-41.
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the citizenry.6
This note begins with a brief statistical update on execution
patterns in the 1990s and their implication for what I shall call the
ambivalence hypothesis. A second section analyzes the relevance of
regional patterns to the prospects for New York's death penalty.
Section III examines the recent history of New York as a predictor
of the future. Section IV is concerned with the limits of historical
data in predicting executions and discusses two ways that the his-
torical pattern might be overcome.
The general conclusion of this analysis is clear. New York's
new death penalty' is a textbook case of mixed feelings and moral
uncertainty. This ambivalence has influenced both the shape of the
death penalty law and the likelihood that the legislation will lead
to an execution in New York, soon or ever. Twenty more years in
New York without an execution would be no surprise.
I. PATTERNS OF EXECUTION IN THE 1990s
The first five years of the 1990s are the laboratory that this
section will use to provide new tests of execution data as an indica-
tor of ambivalence about the death penalty. While the first half of
the decade witnessed many executions, a careful analysis of pat-
terns of recent executions provides important additional evidence
of continuity in execution policy in the American states. This in
turn supports the broad outlines of the ambivalence hypothesis.
Whatever else one might say about the first half of the 1990s,
it was an undoubtedly active period for state-level execution pol-
icy. The five years beginning January 1, 1990 brought witness to
137 executions, an average of over twenty-five per year.8 The num-
ber of executions during this five year period was greater than the
total number of executions experienced in the United States be-
tween 1977 and 1989." The number of states in the United States
conducting executions also expanded rapidly in the 1990s. A total
of eleven states with no previous post-Gregg v. Georgia10 execu-
tions conducted at least one prior to December 31, 1994.11 The nu-
merical total of newly executing states in the five years beginning
6. Id.
7. N.Y. CiRm. PROC. LAw § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
8. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. REPORTER
733 (1994) (hereinafter, DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1994)).
9. There were 120 executions between 1977 and 1989. Id.
10. 428 U.S. 153 (1976)(upholding Georgia's death penalty statute).
11. The eleven states are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Ma.
ryland, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Washington & Wyoming. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1994), supra
note 8, at 734-39.
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January 1, 1990 was equal to the list of newly executing states dur-
ing the whole of the 1980s,12 so that the pace of expansion per year
was about twice as fast over the first five years of the 1990s by that
measure.
There are, however, two indications that the rate of newly exe-
cuting states expanded much more abruptly than an overall com-
parison with the 1980s would suggest. First, the five years prior to
1990 had witnessed only two newly executing states, 13 a rate of ini-
tiation one-fifth as great as that during the early 1990s. 14 Secondly,
the pool of death penalty states with no previous executions had
been shrinking over time. The eight states that began execution in
the first half of the 1980s were twenty-seven percent of the thirty
states that had death penalties but had not yet executed prior to
1980.15 The eleven states that began to execute in the first five
years of the current decade were forty-six percent of the twenty-
four states that could have had a first execution.' By this measure,
the practice of capital punishment has broadened in unprece-
dented fashion in the 1990s.
Does this larger number of executing states signal that execu-
tions are now broadly distributed across the states in the United
States with death penalty laws? The degree to which executions
are evenly spread throughout the United States is not great. And
when the focus shifts from the count of states with some execution
history to the rate of executions, the continuity in regional and his-
torical concentration in executions is still large.
Table 1 begins the tale of continuity in executions by contrast-
ing the 1990-1994 execution record of death penalty states with
some execution during the 1980s and those with none.
12. Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Texas, Utah & Virginia commenced post-Gregg v. Georgia executions during the
1980s. Id.
13. Missouri and Utah. Id. at 734-36.
14. Zimring, supra note 1, at 732 (table 1).
15. NAACP LEGAL DF-NSE AD EDUCATON FUND, INc., DEATH Row, U.S.A. REPORTER
229-39 (1980).
16. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1990), supra note 4, at 67; DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1994), supra
note 8, at 736-38.
19961
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TABLE 1. EXECUTIONS IN DEATH PENALTY STATES, 1990-1994, BY EXECUTION HISTORY 7
Death Penalty States
that Conducted
Executions in the 1980s
Death Penalty States
that Conducted
No Executions in the
1980s
Percentage Conducting
Executions, 1990-1994 92 46
Percentage Conducting
No Executions, 1990-1994 8 54
100% 100%
E W: (13) (24)
The table shows that the immediate past is highly predictive
of executions in the 1990s. Of the thirteen states with executions in
the 1980s, twelve conducted executions in the 1990s (Mississippi is
the lone exception)18. Fewer than half the death penalty states
with no prior executions conducted an execution in the first half of
the 1990s. Small states like Nevada and Utah are among the exe-
cuting recidivists, while large states with big death row populations
such as Ohio, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania did not execute in the
first half of the 1990s.29 So more than size was operative to sepa-
rate the executing and nonexecuting states.
Long-term execution history also seems more important than
size in explaining which death penalty states execute. By Decem-
ber 1994, all of the thirteen states with the highest per capita rate
of execution during the 1950s had executed at least two prison-
ers, o while two states (Ohio and Pennsylvania) which were among
17. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1990), supra note 4, at 67; DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1994), supra
note 8, at 734-39.
18. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1994), supra note 8, at 734-38.
19. Id. at 736-38.
20. Id. The thirteen states with the highest per capita rates of execution during the
1950s are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Nevada, South Carolina, Texas, Utah & Virginia. Zimring, supra note 1, at 738.
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the highest ten in the number of condemned prisoners had not yet
conducted a first execution.21
Furthermore, the concentration of executions in a relatively
small number of death penalty states remains high in the 1990s.
During the 1980s, four of the thirteen states with any executions
(Texas, Florida, Louisiana and Georgia) accounted for almost
three-quarters of all executions.22 During the early 1990s, an even
smaller fraction of the executing states, five out of twenty-four
(Arkansas, Florida, Missouri, Texas and Virginia), produced sev-
enty-two percent of the executions.23 The significant cluster during
the 1980s involved thirty-one percent of the executing states.24 In
the 1990s, the cluster was among five states that were twenty-one
percent of the executing jurisdictions.25
A. Southern Dominance
Two regional concentrations are particularly remarkable in the
1990s. Each continues a pattern observed in the 1980s. The out-
standing regional characteristic of executions in the 1990s is
Southern dominance. The consistent tradition of heavy concentra-
tion of executions in the South extends well back into American
history.26 The manifold changes in execution patterns in the 1990s
have done little to dilute the dominance of Southern states. Of the
137 United States executions in the first half of the 1990s, 112 or
eighty-two percent, took place in Southern states. The number of
Southern states participating in this practice increased, but the
pattern of regional hegemony continued without significant
change.
While Southern states lead others in many aspects of capital
punishment, the disproportion in executions is much greater than
in earlier phases of capital sentencing. The sixteen Southern states
had fifty-six percent of all condemned prisoners in April 1995, with
1,672 of a total of 3,009.28 The rate of executions per one hundred
21. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1994), supra note 8, at 739-71.
22. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1990), supra note 4, at 71-73.
23. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1994), supra note 8, at 733, 736-38.
24. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1990), supra note 4, at 67, 71-73.
25. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1994), supra note 8, at 733, 736-38.
26. See FANKLIN E. ZIMEING & GORDON HAwKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMER-
icAN AGENDA 26-49 (1986).
27. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1994), supra note 8, at 736-38. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia are considered Southern
states. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN
1988 (1989).
28. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, DEATH Row, U.S.A. REPORTER 773-
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Southern death row inmates in the first half of the 1990s was 2.5
times as great as the rest of the nation.29
B. The Northeastern Drought
An equally dramatic regional pattern-and this one carries di-
rect implications for New York-is the absence of executions in
the Northeastern states. Throughout the period from Gregg v.
Georgia's approval of guided discretion in death sentencing to the
early months of 1995, nobody was executed in any of the states in
the Northeastern United States.30 For most of the nineteen years
since Gregg v. Georgia, three states in the Northeast did not have
a death penalty-New York, Maine and Massachusetts. But very
large states with high rates of homicide did have death penalty
laws virtually identical to those found in some Southern states.
Pennsylvania had one of the five highest death row populations in
1990, but no executions in the first five years of the decade."' New
Jersey and Connecticut also have longstanding capital punishment
legislation and nontrivial death row populations.3 2
The particular explanations for thirty years without an execu-
tion vary from state to state. A Massachusetts death penalty was
invalidated by that state's Supreme Judicial Court.3 3 Recurrent ve-
toes of death penalty legislation by Governors Carey and Cuomo
are the usual explanation for New York's lack of a death penalty
prior to 1995."' New Jersey's Supreme Court has been scrutinizing
the records of death sentence cases on a regular basis in ways
which reduce both the numbers on death row and increase the
time through the system for death cases.3 5 The ambivalence hy-
pothesis would urge viewing all these different phenomena as part
of the same process. The original study concluded:
814 (1995) (hereinafter, DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1995)).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 781.
31. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1990), supra note 4, at 108-34 (death row populations); DEATH
Row, U.SAL. (1994), supra note 8, at 736-38 (executions).
32. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1995), supra note 28, at 789, 800.
33. District Att'y for the Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980).
34. See, e.g., David Von Drehle, Cranking Up the Killing Machine: New York Restores
the Death Penalty, But Will Anyone Be Executed?, WASH. PosT, Feb. 26, 1995, at Cl; Jay
Gallagher and Kyle Hughes, Pataki Signs Death-Penalty Bill, Gannett News Service, Mar.
7, 1995, available in WESTLAW, News, Business and Industry Information, All News Plus
Wires.
35. See, e.g., Gene Warner, Years Could Pass Before Executions Begin Despite Move
for Faster Appeals Process: Delays Protect Defendants, Burx. NEWS, Sept. 17, 1995, at 3A
(citing New Jersey as an example for New York).
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The most plausible model of the impact of execution history as a policy
force is that the lack of a clear historical mandate for execution in a state
results in a reduction of the enthusiasm of elected officials and political
elites for execution, at the same time that it increases the levels of opposi-
tion to execution in a particular state. High historical rates of execution are
associated with more general pressure for execution and less undifferenti-
ated pressure in opposition. How the difference in opposition pressure gets
expressed may vary from state to state and over time. As the aggregate anti-
execution pressure goes up, the probability of blocking executions increases.
Which point in the process responds to a particular level of pressure may
vary depending on the personalities of office holders or accidents of timing,
but as long as the overall chances of nonexecution are determined by aggre-
gate pressure levels, the regularities revealed in the previous section can be
expected.8
The ambivalence hypothesis sees different forms of resistance
to executions as the product of the same general climate and un-
certainty. The same local context that produces gubernatorial ve-
toes renders strict judicial scrutiny more likely if the governor does
not veto the law, and produces more reluctance about prosecuting
death cases among big city district attorneys. In this view, particu-
lar obstacles to execution should not be viewed as isolated phe-
nomena that do not predict other impediments to execution.
My view of the period 1990-1994 is consistent with the earlier
statistical findings. One of the major findings of my research note
published in 1990 was an extraordinary continuity between the ex-
ecution behavior of states in the 1950s and the legislative and exe-
cution pattern in those states in the years following Gregg v. Geor-
gia.87 While the prevalence of execution broadened in the first five
years of the 1990s, the geography of executions in the United
States continued to follow traditional patterns, and the incidence
of executions in the 1990s was, by one measure, even more concen-
trated in the high execution states of the South than during the
1980s.18 The question to be addressed next is what these continu-
ities predict about death sentences and executions in the state of
New York in the first years of the twentieth-first century.
II. NEW YORK IN REGIONAL CONTEXT
What can we add to our ability to predict outcomes in New
York by looking at the behavior of other states in the region? Cer-
tainly much in New York is unique. But regional patterns may
36. Zimring, supra note 1, at 741.
37. Id. at 739-40.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
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help to explain why New York was prone to the events that have
occurred. The particular circumstances of capital punishment leg-
islation in New York over the years since Gregg v. Georgia are un-
duplicated anywhere else in the United States. For the twenty
years between 1975 and 1995, the Empire State had only two gov-
ernors, Hugh Carey and Mario Cuomo. Until Cuomo lost the 1994
election, these governors had won five consecutive statewide elec-
tions despite a total of eighteen separate vetoes of death penalty
enactments passed by the legislature.39 By the time a Republican
governor who pledged to sign death penalty legislation was elected,
the governors of New York had probably vetoed more death pen-
alty bills than the governors of all the other states in the United
States combined over the entire course of the twentieth century.
There are two ways to regard this extraordinary story when
thinking about the likely future of New York's new death penalty.
On the one hand, the Carey-Cuomo interlude can be viewed as an
isolated historical occurrence in New York's political history-as a
set of actions that reflect the character of these two governors as
individuals, but does not provide any indication of feelings about
the death penalty in government or in the general population. In
this view, once the obstacles of gubernatorial opposition had been
removed, the previous history of stalemate by veto tells observers
nothing about the likelihood or timing of executions in New York's
future.
A second approach to New York's recent history would argue
that the peculiar ecology of pass-then-veto death penalty legisla-
tion in New York grew out of a set of social and governmental cir-
cumstances that are likely to influence the course of future events
as well. Further, this second perspective might also suggest that
the long period prior to 1995 with its recurrent vetoes and without
a death penalty is now an important part of New York history, an
era which helped to shape current attitudes and may continue to
alter the behavior of persons with the power to influence the ad-
ministration of the death penalty in New York.
As between these two accounts, it seems prudent to assume
that Hugh Carey and Mario Cuomo were not the consecutive prod-
ucts of random chance. Indeed, it would require substantial politi-
cal innocence to believe that the repeated vetoes of death penalty
legislation were historical events that did not in any way identify
New York as a jurisdiction with ambivalent feelings about the
death penalty. Could a governor who repeatedly vetoes death pen-
39. Joel Stashenko, Death Penalty Critics Doubt State is Ready, BUFF. NEws, Aug. 27,
1995, at As. See Gus Bliven, Downstaters Monopolize Albany, THE POST STANDARD, Nov.
25, 1994, at As.
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alty legislation be reelected twice in Texas, in North Carolina, or in
Arkansas? If not, then the fact of the postponement-by-veto may
tell us that other obstacles to execution are likely to take root in
the same soil that encouraged gubernatorial veto. And the recent
history of gubernatorial opposition may have itself influenced the
atmosphere in which future decisions about capital punishment are
made.
Holding as I do to the notion that New York's previous history
is a prediction of future trends, some hypotheses about future im-
pact become the next task. What influence might New York's re-
cent history have on its future death penalty decision making?
When should observers expect to see the state approach a decision
about whether to proceed with an execution?
Let me summarize my conclusions, then review some relevant
evidence. If New York is typical of the other states with death pen-
alty laws on their books, it should be at least a decade before any
defendant who does not wish to die would be at risk of execution.
If New York's experience is typical of the states in its region, then
about two decades should pass until the execution of a
nonvolunteer subject would be on the near horizon. Finally, if New
York's recent history has produced additional impetus against exe-
cution, then executions in the foreseeable future may not happen
at all. Not in the foreseeable future is my best guess on the availa-
ble evidence.
Some historical data to support these assertions comes from
the delays to first execution experienced by states with death pen-
alties after Gregg v. Georgia was decided by the Supreme Court in
1976. The crudest measure would be the median gap between the
Gregg judgment and first execution for states with a death penalty
statute in effect in June 1976. Wyoming and Delaware were the
median states, the seventeenth and eighteenth states out of the
thirty-five with post Furman v. Georgia40 death statutes; they did
so in 1992, sixteen years after the Gregg decision. 41
A more refined measure would compute the delay to execution
only for large metropolitan states because a high volume of homi-
cide cases produces many more potential death penalty cases and
might reduce the time delay between a death penalty law and the
first execution. Table 2 shows the delay between the date of the
Gregg v. Georgia decision and the first execution in those of the
ten most populous states with death penalties for murder.
40. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
41. DEATH Row U.S.A. (1994), supra note 8, at 737.
1996]
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TABLE 2. DELAY FROM THE GREGG V. GEORGIA DECISION TO FIRST EXECUTION, STATES
WITH THE TEN LARGEST POPULATIONS
42
U.S. States with the Year of First Execution Time Lapse from Gregg or
Largest Populations Passage of Death Penalty
1. California 1992 16 years
2. Texas 1982 6 years
3. New York* ....
4. Florida 1979 3 years
5. Pennsylvania 1995 19 years
6. Illinois 1990 14 years
7. Ohio No executions, 20 years or more
as of August 1996
8. Michigan** ..
9. New Jersey*** No executions, 15 years or more
as of August 1996
10. North Carolina 1984 8 years
* No death penalty until 1995.
** No death penalty.
***" Death penalty statute, effective 1980.
Eight of the largest states had death penalty statutes. The me-
dian delay to first execution is between fourteen and fifteen years
for these metropolitan states. The three large states which con-
ducted a first execution less than a decade after Gregg are in the
South. The minimum delay to execution outside the South was
fourteen years in Illinois. For a non-Southern state with a large
population, a fifteen-year delay between the effective date of a
42. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABsTRAcTr OF THE UNITD STATES 1995 (115th ed.
1995) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRAcT]; DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1995), supra note 28, at 907-
13.
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death penalty statute and the first execution would, on historical
patterns, be a minimum guess.
But measuring New York's prospects against all states outside
the South understates the potential influence of regional tenden-
cies on death penalty policy. On every measure of death penalty
severity, the Northeastern states fall well under the national
norms. Of the three states in the region with longstanding death
penalties, only Pennsylvania has conducted an execution, and that
came nineteen years after Gregg v. Georgia.4 New Jersey and Con-
necticut have not yet executed." The chances of arriving on death
row and of staying there are also lower in the Northeast. New
Jersey, the ninth largest state in the union, had nine persons on its
death row in April 1995, while North Carolina, the tenth largest
state, had 155." Ohio, the Northern state closest to New Jersey in
population that has a death penalty had a death row population of
142.46 The state of Connecticut had a death row population of five
in 1995.' Only Pennsylvania has a ratio of death row population to
state population close to non-Southern national averages.48
One final indication of the different policy climate in the
Northeast concerns the risk of executions. One measure of the risk
of execution for those on death row compares the ratio of execu-
tions to death row populations. Table 3 shows death row popula-
tions by region for 1990, executions by region for 1990-1994, and
the number of death row occupants for each execution.
43. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1995), supra note 28, at 912.
44. Id. at 913.
45. STATITICAL ABSmACr, supra note 42, at 29 (population); DEATH Row, U.S.A.
(1995), supra note 28, at 800 (death row population).
46. STATiSTICAL ABSTACr, supra note 42, at 29 (population); DEATH Row, U.S.A (1995),
supra note 28, at 802 (death row population).
47. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1995), supra note 28, at 789.
48. The fifth-largest state, Pennsylvania, had the fourth-largest death row population:
168. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT supra note 42, at 29 (population); DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1994),
supra note 8, at 721.
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TABLE 3. 1990-1994 EXECUTIONS AS A PROPORTION OF 1990 DEATH Row POPULATIONS
49
South Northeast Rest of the
United States
Death Row Population, 1,355 139 848
May 1990
1990-1994 Executions 112 0 25
Ratio 12 to1 -- 34 to 1
Aggregated to the regional level, condemned prisoners in the
South faced a five-year risk of execution that was approximately
one in twelve. In the Northeast, the risk was zero. Outside the
South and Northeast, the risk was one in thirty-four.
There are two ways of putting this information in perspective.
First, if Northeastern prisoners had been executed at the rate of
other non-Southern states, four executions should have occurred in
the three states with death row populations. Even pushing Penn-
sylvania's lone 1995 execution back into the earlier period would
leave the region with an execution risk about one-fourth of the
other Northern states.
A second perspective on regional influence comes from the
Southern ratios. Controlling for all the other regional influences
that reduce death sentences, the Northeast's death row population
would still be expected to produce twelve executions at prevailing
Southern rates during a period when no executions occurred.
By all available measures, the processes that determine rates
of execution predict much more resistance to execution in the
Northeast than in other non-Southern states. There are variations
in pattern within the region, of course. Pennsylvania generates
much higher rates of death sentences than Connecticut and New
Jersey. But a low rate of execution risk has been uniform in the
region since Gregg v. Georgia.5 0
If this history is predictive of future events, those who hoped
that the major obstacles to execution in New York had been re-
moved when the legislation became effective are likely to be disap-
49. DEa Row, U.S.A. (1990), supra note 4, at 67-100; DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1994),
supra note 8, at 731-39.
50. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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pointed. To the extent that New York follows regional patterns,
the path to executions will be anything but smooth.
But the importance of regional patterns can, of course, be
overstated. The unit of government that is most importantly in-
volved in the death penalty is the state. Texas and Oklahoma oc-
cupy the same subregion, but Texas has conducted twenty-three
times as many executions.5 1 This is only one example of vastly dif-
ferent execution policies at work in contiguous states. So the next
important level of analysis in considering the prospects for capital
punishment in New York is the particular circumstances of the
state of New York. What elements of New York history, criminal
justice, and social conditions are relevant to its prospects for capi-
tal punishment?
Ill. NEw YORK AS A PARTICULAR CASE
This is not the proper place to recount the full history of the
death penalty in New York, let alone to catalog many of the other
distinctive features of New York that are of potential relevance to
capital punishment policy. But summary statistics are in order.
Taking its execution policy in the 1950s as a baseline measure of
the state's policy, New York was twenty-second of the thirty-six
states that conducted executions in the 1950s in its per capita rate
of executions.52 That per capita rank puts New York in the com-
pany of other larger Northern states such as Ohio (twenty-first),
Pennsylvania (twenty-fifth), and New Jersey (twenty-third).5 3 But
this low rate of executions per 100,000 persons understates the sig-
nificance of the practice in the state in the period. Because New
York was the nation's most populous state in the 1950s, it con-
ducted the fourth highest number of executions during the decade,
a larger number than occurred in Florida or Mississippi.5 The
number of executions statewide is a better measure of both public-
ity about executions and potential for the expression of public con-
cern than the per capita rate of execution. Where public support
for executions is not solid, a recurrent pattern of execution may
generate a substantial level of conflict and controversy. New York
was one of four states that were in the top half of all death penalty
jurisdictions in the number of executions in the 1950s, but in the
bottom half of executing jurisdictions in per capita rate. The other
three states were Pennsylvania (eight out of thirty-six versus
51. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1995), supra note 28, at 781.
52. ZIMBING & HAwIUNS, supra note 26, at 136 (table 7.2).
53. Id.
54. Id.
1996]
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twenty-five out of thirty-six), Ohio (seven out of thirty-six versus
twenty-one out of thirty-six), and New Jersey (fifteen out of thirty-
six versus twenty-three out of thirty-six).5 5 These four states, all
with death penalties, to date have performed an aggregate total of
two executions since Gregg v. Georgia.6 These high-volume/low-
rate states cluster in the Northeast, so that it is difficult to sepa-
rate regional characteristics from the influence of tensions pro-
duced by frequent but controversial executions.
There are two aspects of New York as a particular case that
are of incontrovertible importance in predicting death penalty fu-
tures. One is the moral and political legacy of the twenty years
without a death penalty after 1975. The second is the death pen-
alty law itself-a distinctive statutory enactment quite different
from the copycat statutes enacted in most states to minimize liti-
gation hazards.
The twenty-year tug-of-war on the death penalty altered the
environment in which a death penalty would eventually be enacted
in many ways. The long period without any law in effect means
that current prosecutors, judges, and other system actors have al-
most without exception spent their careers in a justice system
without a death penalty. The system to process such cases had to
be designed from scratch. The 1995 legislation was thus not the
reinstatement of a New York death penalty, but its invention.
While capital punishment was in no sense part of the status
quo in New York, a debate about the death penalty had become by
1995 a longstanding event inside government. Particularly during
the Cuomo years, a two-sided political debate on the morality and
necessity of capital punishment was a standard element in state
politics. This ongoing debate within the political establishment is
rare if not unknown in state-level political processes in the United
States. Instead, discussion of the death penalty is quietly avoided
in jurisdictions that have long abolished it and two-sided debate is
usually precluded in death penalty states by the feeling that capi-
tal punishment is an overwhelming political necessity. The ongoing
debate in New York was the most visible and sustained at any
level of government in the United States since 1980.
This recent tradition of debate inspired more than one incum-
bent prosecutor to oppose the proposed death penalty and to re-
serve the option of not seeking death on a wholesale basis.57 The
55. Id.
56. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1995), supra note 28, at 913.
57. Adam Nossiter, Balking Prosecutors: A Door Opens to Death Row Challenges, N.Y.
Tnos, Mar. 11, 1995, at 27. See also, Jan Hoffman, Death Penalty Raises Issue of Obliga-
tion of Prosecutor, N.Y. Tms, Mar. 17, 1996, at 33; Jan Hoffman, Lawyers Prepare for
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only other settings I know of where prosecutors oppose death pen-
alties are states where the penalty has long been abolished.5
In New York, however, the long public opposition of governors
to a death penalty gave some legitimating precedent to the decla-
ration of personal views. Opposition to capital punishment, while
never politically expedient, could at least be regarded as the moral
high ground in political debate. The long history of public criticism
of capital punishment also created sensitivity in the political pro-
cess to issues such as effective defense representation, careful defi-
nitions of capital crimes, and scrutiny to avoid racially-influenced
patterns of sentencing.
In drafting and debating a death penalty, the New York legis-
lature eventually passed a law that established a minimum stan-
dard for a legally acceptable death sentencing system that is sub-
stantially higher than any set forth by a state legislature anywhere
else. In this sense, one of the important legacies of the Carey-
Cuomo years was in the structure and details of the New York
statute passed despite their opposition.
There can be little doubt that the new law with its substantive
novelty and high minimum standards is itself a substantial barrier
to any early executions in the Empire State. The relatively narrow
definition of capital murder both reduces the potential case flow
and highlights what might seem like arbitrary distinctions between
capital and noncapital killing. Provisions dealing with what has
been called "racial justice" draw attention to potential injustice
and generate new issues for extensive state-level litigation and
delay.
But no element in the new system undermines the execu-
tioner's prospects as much as the extensive provisions for defense
representation.59 In theory, thorough and effective representation
at trial and on appeal should reduce the rate of initial capital sen-
tencing, but might hasten the conclusion of the collateral review
process for cases that survive initial scrutiny. In practice, however,
good lawyers are capable of stalemating the death penalty at all
stages when conducting legal contests in sympathetic environ-
ments. Effective legal representation and the resources to support
it seem quite probable under the New York system. A sympathetic
judiciary, at least at the appellate level, is a high probability.
New York's Death Penalty, N.Y. ThMEs, Aug. 31, 1995, at 1.
58. The Hennepin County district attorney testified against a bill to introduce a death
penalty to Minnesota eighty years after it had been abolished. Donna Halvorsen, Senate
Panel Rejects Death-Penalty Bill; Backers May Try to Tack Issue Onto Crime Bill, Put it
to Voters, STAR Tam., Feb. 25, 1992, at B1.
59. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 35-b (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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There are real doubts that the death penalty process in New York
can survive the legal representation it provides to capital
defendants.
The judicial and administrative decision makers who will
stand in judgment in New York capital cases are also products of
the Carey-Cuomo era in two respects. They have grown used to a
system without death cases and have functioned in a political envi-
ronment where opposition to capital punishment was respectable.
State appellate judges will confront an environment where death
penalties are sought only in some counties. These seem like cir-
cumstances which invite the strictest scrutiny for particular cases
where a capital sentence is pursued and obtained.
So a number of features of New York-the statute, the politi-
cal climate vis-&-vis executions, and the attitudes and expectations
of those who administer the system-interact to make this state
perhaps the least likely metropolitan state that has passed a capi-
tal statute to conduct an execution. If history is a reliable guide,
any execution in New York is so far off that it is beyond the visible
horizon. As far ahead as we can see, executions seem unlikely.
It is not clear that this prognosis would generate depression
even among many of those who voted in the legislature for the new
death penalty. In many ways, the death penalty law itself was the
symbolic victory desired, and the remote prospect of an execution
was not a major issue. This may be one reason why the minimum
standards set out in the statute were accepted with equanimity by
the supporters of the death penalty. The major focus of the effort
was producing a legislative result. The campaign issue was a death
penalty, not executions.
IV. Two ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS
There is, of course, nothing inevitable about the dominance of
historical patterns on capital punishment policy in New York or
anywhere else. The death penalty in the 1990s is a journey into the
unknown, so the predictability of future events is easy to overstate.
This section will briefly discuss two scenarios that might produce a
greater likelihood of New York State experiencing an execution
within the next decade. The first scenario concerns the pressure
exerted by a capital defendant who either requests a death sen-
tence or, having received one, asks to drop all appeals. The second
scenario is a change in the procedures for considering capital ap-
peals and collateral attacks that might push some New York of-
fenders onto a faster track for execution, say 2006 instead of 2016.
In my view, the first scenario is more likely than the second.
The 1995 NAACP statistical summary of executions and death
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row inmates lists thirty-six of the 277 executions reported as cases
where the defendant abandoned appeals prior to execution, a rate
of one for every eight executions.8 0 The degree to which these
dropped appeals accelerate the execution process varies widely, as
does the condemned prisoners' motivations, but the existence of a
defendant who no longer wishes to pursue an appeal could present
a state with an opportunity to execute long before the ordinary
appellate timetable would have run. For this reason, the defendant
who drops their appeal can be important in initiating executions
ahead of any predicted order. Indeed, this was the process that
launched the modern era of executions in 1977.61
It appears that the influence of defendants who drop appeals
is particularly important in states without previous executions
where there is no strong support for executions. Table 4 uses the
NAACP data to classify whether the first execution in a state is
either a dropped appeals case or a fully contested case.
60. DnATH Row, U.S.A. (1995), supra note 28, at 781.
61. See NoRMAN MA=FE, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG 509 (1979).
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TABLE 4. DID THE FIRST DEFENDANT EXECUTED DROP HIS APPEALS? 62
Non-Southern State Southern State
Percentage of First-
Executeds who Dropped 54 23
Their Appeals
Percentage of First-
Executeds Who Did Not 46 77
Drop Their Appeals
Total 100% 100%
_ (13) (13)
More than half of the first executions in the non-Southern
states were of defendants who dropped appeals while less than a
quarter of the first executions in Southern states were so classified.
Presumably, the much larger concentration of dropped appeals in
the non-Southern setting means that these defendants were more
often the actual cause of executions starting in the North before
they would have started without the abandoned appeals.
The first scenario that might hasten the executioner in New
York is the case of an aggressive volunteer who demands to be exe-
cuted. How likely is that to occur? It is certainly not impossible
that an aggressive volunteer will be presented in New York, but
what happens then?
There are three reasons why New York might not have a per-
sistent execution volunteer. In the first place, most of the execu-
tion cases where appeals are dropped are not of the aggressive
"Gary Gilmore"6 variety. Secondly, the odds of a true volunteer
would be a function of the number of death sentences in the state,
and there are indications that the number of new death sentences
each year will be low in New York.
Thirdly, dropped appeal cases tend to cluster rather than to
62. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (1995), supra note 28, at 776-81.
63. A ALER, supra note 60. See Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48
U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 853 (1987).
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be evenly distributed across death row populations. All five of Ne-
vada's executions are listed as volunteers, as are two of the four
executions in Utah. By contrast, many states with large death rows
have had no successful volunteers. Two elements that seem to pre-
vent the dropping of appeals are realistic prospects of victory in
the courts and effective assistance of counsel. Thus, New York's
favorable climate for death penalty appeals and the generous pro-
visions of defense services both should reduce the chances that an
aggressive volunteer will insist on execution.
Still, there is no assurance that New York's answer to Gary
Gilmore will not pop up in the early years of the new death pen-
alty. The opportunities for publicity and prominence in a New
York environment might act as a spur for an aggressive volunteer.
How, then, might the system respond? Without doubt, New York
judges will subject the mental capacity and sufficiency of legal
counsel of such a volunteer to extensive scrutiny. The reactions of
a New York governor would depend in part on who happens to be
governor. But even a pro-capital punishment governor might wish
to avoid the spotlight that gubernatorial clemency decision making
as a last chance would represent. So judicial diversion of death
penalty volunteers might serve the interests of even a law-and-or-
der governor.
With all these qualifications, I would still rank a volunteer epi-
sode as the largest chance New York has of coming close to an
execution in the next decade. The odds favor some such defendant
presenting himself and the reactions of the courts and executive
branch are difficult to predict. For this reason, I would expect that
contingency planning for a volunteer case will be a mid-term prior-
ity of a centralized capital defender program.
The second scenario will be called a "pattern break" here for
want of a better label. A proponent of this view would characterize
the last fifteen years as a struggle to overcome the historical re-
straints on execution policy in the United States that have been in
place since the mid-1960s. Federal legislative and Supreme Court
inroads are major chapters in this war on tradition, and the in-
crease in execution volume in the United States to over fifty in
1995 can be taken as evidence that the revolution is finally suc-
ceeding. Under these circumstances, it might be argued, previous
state and regional patterns will not be predictive of executions in
the same ways that was true when a stalemate pattern was in
effect.
This capital punishment version of the end of history misreads
the events of the early 1990s if it reads regional and state proclivi-
ties as now less important than was the case in the prior decades.
The major changes that have been achieved by those attempting to
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reduce the barriers to execution have come in federal habeas
corpus controls. While this might reduce the average time from
conviction and sentence to execution in the aggregate, it will prob-
ably increase the divergence in pattern from state to state and
make the particular patterns of state-level sentiments and struc-
tures more important rather than less important as the federal
safety net is stretched thin. A diminished role for habeas corpus
might reduce time to execution everywhere, but not in equal mea-
sure. The real acceleration will take place in states like Texas
where the federal influence was the major restraining influence and
where federal judges are sympathetic to decontrolling executions.
Almost literally, the last place that changes in federal standards
for oversight will make a major difference is in New York, a setting
where highly ambivalent elites have constructed elaborate state-
level restraints that have yet to be tested. Federal decontrol will
expand the divergence in death penalty outcomes state by state.
Such was clearly the pattern discussed in Section I during the first
five years of the 1990s. It is the high-execution-rate states where
the majority of the increase in execution activity is also concen-
trated. States like New York will get to the back of the line and
stay there for many years.
The changes necessary to accelerate executions in New York
would be in the hearts and minds of those who administer the local
criminal justice system. To date, this is the sort of state-level
change that has not occurred as the federal restraints on execu-
tions have been eased. The pressure for executions has increased
the flow, but the flow has still been concentrated in those states
which have been the traditional channels of high execution activ-
ity. All of the indicators discussed in Section HI suggests that New
York is operating now at some distance from the attitudes and in-
stitutions that permits high levels of execution to occur.
CONCLUSION
The title of this article was inspired by the admonition in
Paul's letter to the Romans: "The wages of sin is death."' In New
York the wages of ambivalence appear to be a protracted period in
limbo: New York seems destined to spend many years with a death
penalty but no executions. This state of limbo will still represent a
symbolic victory of those who passed the 1995 legislation, and this
feeling of vindication on their part may take some pressure off ju-
dicial and legislative institutions even without executions.
If New York goes twenty years without an execution, the end
64. Romans 6:23.
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of such an execution limbo will be far enough removed from 1996
so that larger shifts in policy about the death penalty in the
United States will probably determine the eventual course of
events in New York. 5
As a matter of principle, limbo in execution policy is an unsat-
isfactory condition. That does not mean, however, that execution
limbo is not preferable to the possible alternatives achievable in
the near future. For those interested in avoiding executions, the
current New York death penalty statute seems well designed to
promote that goal. To the extent that ambivalence was a dominant
emotion in the death penalty debate of 1994-1995, the New York
law is as much the product of Governor Cuomo's efforts as those of
Governor Pataki. It would be better by far to have no death pen-
alty. But a statute that contains a fair measure of self-critical prin-
ciples and procedures may be the best hope in New York for mud-
dling through a mean season of American criminal justice.
65. For one hopeful account of these changes, see ZDIRING & HAwINS, supra note 26,
at 148-66.
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